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The
Golden Gang
of Three/
by ANTONIO

H

A. AMADOR

/ Regional Tax Director-Asia/Pacific,

ow did three highly successful
island economies in the
western Pacific achieve their
solid fiscal records?
Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong
have been cited as having the best
performing economies in a field of 85
countries. The U.S. ranked 25th in the
survey, which covered the period from
1974 to 1981.
Using the 1973 oil crisis as the starting
point, Euromoney, an international
financial monthly, employed a weighted
formula of five variables: economic
growth, rate of inflation, strength of
SDR (special drawing rights) exchange,
export growth, and balance of payments. While most countries blame
the price of oil as the primary cause of
sluggish economic growth, the front
runners ironically have a common
handicap-a lack of oil to fuel rapid
industrial expansion. Other similarities
among Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong
Kong are superficial, the study said, and
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can easily be misleading. All are island
economies that depend on manufacturing for export. The population in all
three is ethnically Chinese. And all
three have strong central governments.
The similarities end there.
The differences, in fact, far outweigh
the similarities. Singapore is a sovereign
republic, while Taiwan wants to assert a
sovereignty that most of the world
refuses to recognize. Hong Kong is a
colony where people do not vote and
are not interested in the vote. Government intervention in business is
markedly strong in Taiwan, selectively
assertive in Singapore, and comparatively weak in Hong Kong. Taiwan has a
semblance of a primary economic base:
agriculture. Both Singapore and Hong
Kong have practically no such base.
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Hong Kong is ahead in the tertiary
services sector —banking, finance,
transport and tourism, social and
personal services—followed by Singapore. Finally, the fiscal policies of the
three countries are diverse, although all
have the objective of raising revenue.
The fiscal policies of these countries
will be examined in this article. The
fiscal strategies employed to achieve
economic objectives will be surveyed,
but no attempt will be made to reconcile how the different fiscal policies
achieve the same objective. The
economic achievements of the three
countries will be outlined and the
investment outlook surveyed.

TAIWAN
The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), a
grouping of the world's industrial
countries, recently nominated Taiwan
as one of the ten "newly industrialising"
countries. Dr. Herman Kahn of the
Hudson Institute in New York attributed
the Taiwan economic miracle to the
"fostering of a dedicated, motivated,
responsible, and educated citizenry and
a sense of commitment, organizational
identity, and institutional loyalty." When
Cesar Virata, the Philippines's prime
minister, was asked how it was that
Taiwan was so much ahead of his
resource-rich country, his answer was
simply, "Well, they are different. They
were trained by the Japanese." Indeed,
Taiwan was occupied by Japan for
50 years, just as the Philippines was
under U.S. tutelage for almost 50 years.
Traditionally, Taiwan was a two-crop
economy, sugar and rice. When the
retreating armies of Chiang Kai Shek
took refuge on the island, the lesson of
defeat they brought with them was the
tactic of victory employed by Chairman
Mao—land for the landless. In 1951, the
Kuomintang government instituted a

massive land reform. It also provided
incentives for raising farm productivity,
thereby increasing purchasing power.
With the expansion of the agricultural
industry, the government turned to
strengthening the island's physical and
social infrastructure, in particular
making education available at all levels.
This set the environment for growth.
Today, 95 percent of the young workers
of Taiwan have received at least eight
years of education.
In the late fifties, the economic
planners developed the manufacture of
a wide variety of consumer goods. This
reduced unemployment, further
increased purchasing power, and
widened income distribution. To
encourage private savings and capital
formation, attractive interest rates were
coupled with tax incentives. Finally, to
overcome the limited size of the
domestic market, export-oriented
industries received massive government
assistance in the form of tax relief, soft
loans, and other measures to be
discussed below. This strategy succeeded beyond everyone's expectations. In the fifties, the total trade
amounted to about a third of a billion
U.S. dollars. In a little over two decades,
it grew to US$24 billion, a 70-fold
increase. In the fifties, manufacturing
accounted for less than 14 percent of
the gross domestic product (GDP).
Today, it represents more than
30 percent and is comparable to most
developed western European economies. By 1978, this island state of
17.6 million people was the eighth
largest trading partner of the U.S. and its
fourth largest supplier of manufactured
goods after Japan, Canada, and West
Germany.
The government's fiscal policy is
geared to raising revenues to meet the
needs of both public investment and

government services. Sustained
economic growth increases tax
revenues, of course. In fact, Taiwan's
revenues since 1964 have outpaced the
increase in government investment and
expenditures—despite inflationary
obstacles.
To maintain its growth pace, the
government has employed imaginative
fiscal incentives. These measures
necessarily resulted in lower revenues
from profits tax, but they did not result
in a deficit. The government counterbalanced this by establishing customs and
tariff measures which insulated
domestic industry from outside competition. However, the tariff wall was built
with several openings. Doors were
designed for foreign manufacturers to
import capital goods with high
technology. They also were designed
for manufacturers who will produce
goods for export, train workers in
superior production techniques, and
introduce efficient management and
marketing strategies. Manufacturers
who bring new ideas and products may
own 100 percent of their operations and
may remit all profits plus repatriate 20
percent of invested capital annually.
Thus, the doors are open to go in and
out.
In addition to a five-year tax holiday,
there is an exemption from tariff duties
for experimental instruments and
equipment not domestically produced.
To top these perks, up to 90 percent of
the total letters of credit for export sales
will be financed with soft loans,
generally at about half the prevailing
discount rate. The purchase of plant
premises-of up to 70 percent of
cost—also can be financed with low
rates for as long as 10 years. Many real
estate taxes, sale taxes, stamp duties,
and municipal taxes also have been
drastically reduced.
The tax and nontax incentives have
worked. But will they continue to
work? The cloud that hangs over Taiwan
is really the protectionist sentiment in
the developed countries. Taiwan is
slowly lowering its tariff walls in
response to this sentiment. But it will
need to import greater technology to
increase the value of its exported
products. Quality will have to replace

quantity. Because Taiwan is no longer a
labour-surplus economy, capital intensity will have to take the place of labour
intensity. With lower tariff revenues to
finance the restructuring of industrial
production, however, it is doubtful
whether the budget surplus can be
maintained forever. No longer can the
10,000 postal savings banks, which
accept deposits even on Sundays,
finance the required restructuring of
industrial production. In about five
years the economy will mature, and
with maturity comes an industrial
economy's problems of deficits and
inflation.
On the other hand, Taiwan is not a
highly leveraged economy. Its foreign
debt, in fact, is smaller than its foreign
currency reserves. Taiwan has recourse
to the world's capital markets. Thus, an
economy which attains this level of
industrial development can compete. If
the "commitment, organizational
identity, and institutional loyalty" are
kept intact, Taiwan not only will
compete, it will compete well.

SINGAPORE
Fifty years ago, according to W.
Somerset Maughan, the busy streets of
Singapore were filled with rickshaws,
sweaty, fat Dutchmen, masters of tramp
steamers, out-of-work mining
engineers, planters from the Malay
peninsula on vacation, wealthy
merchants giving lavish luncheon
parties, Chinese, Malays, and Sikhs. The
characters you meet in Lee Kuan Yew's
island republic are still the same, except
their jobs have changed.
Dutchmen are more likely to be
shipping executives of container
shipping lines. The engineers are
probably designers of rigs. After all,
Singapore is the world's largest builder
of jack-up rigs and the second largest
builder of submersibles. The planters on

holiday of 50 years ago are today log
exporters from Sarawak and Sabah. The
luncheon parties are replaced by
bankers' closing cocktail parties. The
population is still Chinese, Malay, and
Indian. Richshaws, however, have given
way to Datsuns.
The British East India Company
founded Singapore as a trading station
more than 160 years ago. Entrepot trade
and commerce was and still is an
important element (about 25 percent)
in the composition of Singapore's GDR
Transport (14 percent), manufacturing
(27 percent), financial and business
services (15 percent) basically make up
the economy of this island state of
about 2.4 million people. The financial
sector was the fastest growing industry
last year. It is the sexy sector of the
economy. The government is actively
pursuing its expansion as the pay scales
in this vibrant area begin to compare
with most western economies.
Manufacturing, however, remains the
largest component of the GDP and still
rates high on the scale of government
priority.
The economy grew at an inflation
adjusted rate of 10.2 percent in 1980. The
government hopes to maintain the
momentum between 8 to 10 percent
growth annually over the next decade, a
projection that is not really out of line
with other nations in the region. This
rate of expansion is about two to three
times greater than in Europe and North
America.
A disciplined work force, constantly
exhorted by the government propaganda machinery to adopt "the
Japanese way of thinking," is the stellar
attraction Singapore offers foreign
capital. The loft and wings of Singapore's stage are packed with tax and
nontax incentives.
For the manufacturing sectorconsidered by the government as a
pioneer industry—a tax relief of five
years, or a longer period not exceeding
ten years, is liberally granted. Dividends
declared out of the exempt income is
similarly exempt from tax when it
reaches the hands of investors. And if a
manufacturing concern contemplates
expanding its production through

capital investment of about US$5
million, it will receive tax relief for five
years. Similarly, a company engaged in
the production of goods for export can
secure a tax relief on its export profits.
To the commercial and trading sector,
the government gives a wide variety of
incentives. Companies engaged in
warehousing or in servicing products
for reexport receive a 50 percent
discount on export profits. A company
engaged in consulting, engineering, or
management can take home 50 percent
tax-free income from overseas projects.
When local companies promote
exports in foreign trade fairs, conduct
foreign market studies, or publish
promotional export materials, they get a
double deduction for expenses
incurred, subject to certain limitations.
As for the banking and financial
services sector, profits generated from
loans to borrowers outside Singapore
are taxed at the minimal rate of
10 percent.
This wealth of incentives has proven
successful in attracting foreign capital
and expertise to Singapore. However,
the tack which Singapore must take to
justify its recent wage increases must be
bold; otherwise, its competitive stance
may be lost against such low-wage
cities as Manila, Djakarta, or even Kuala
Lumpur. Productivity must improve
radically; the value added to raw
materials must be high; and research
and development for high technology
products will have to be encouraged.
The 1982 budget was structured to
increase productivity, (including
through personal income tax cuts) and
to encourage industries in the services
sector. The targeted productivity
increase is between 6 to 8 percent
annually. Computer programming,
consulting, and financial services are
the areas which the government hopes
to be the leading edge of the 10 percent
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inflation-adjusted growth of the
economy. If the government succeeds
in its objective (and on its track record
alone there is no reason why it
shouldn't) Singaporeans will reach
japan's current level of per capita GNP
by the end of this decade.
As a financial centre, the government
has several ideas to attract insurance
services and fund management
services. More regional and international companies will be encouraged to
list their shares on the local stock
exchange. Members of the Singapore
Gold Exchange, either as brokers or
dealers, are now taxed 10 percent on
transactions in gold bullion.
In order to sell high skill and high
value-added medical services, tax
incentives are being considered for
investment in hospitals and in medical
equipment. Apart from training more
doctors, Singapore's medical registry
will be opened to qualified foreign
doctors without the necessity of
reciprocity.
Tax liberalisation policies also are
being studied to include:

of living comes such mundane ideas as
flexibility, less regimentation, and more
freedom.
Some students have started to
grumble. A member of parliament in
opposition to Lee Kuan Yew's People's
Action Party was elected in an October
by-election—the first time this has
occurred since the sixties. The challenge
of the future is how to loosen the reins
of government. Singaporeans may no
longer be content after three years of an
annual 20 percent pay increase. They
may start to ask, if not demand, intangible benefits. As a petite student of
French in Singapore's National University aptly put it, "Singaporeans will no
longer be content with what is
mandated they should get. We will
stand up one day instead of simply
sitting under a tree waiting for Godot."

• Revised depreciation schedules to
encourage automation.

A family of four, on arriving in Hong
Kong from Manhattan, took a taxi
through the harbour tunnel. When the
taxi surfaced on the Hong Kong side,
the four-year-old girl told her father,
"Papa, we are home." Obviously, the
little girl thought they had just crossed
the Lincoln Tunnel under the Hudson
and surfaced amidst towering buildings
on 42nd Street.
Hong Kong's population, like that of
Manhattan's, lives and works at an
urgent pace—the pedestrians weaving
their way through the congested noisy
traffic or hurrying along crowded
pavements from one air-conditioned
office to the next. Shops in Central
Hong Kong are as elegant as those on
Fifth Avenue in midtown. Shopkeepers
in both cities are not there to develop
sales; they are there to sell, period.
Students of history probably will
conclude that it was simply an aberration in the normal course of human
events when, in the second half of the

• Accelerated depreciation for
computers and R & D equipment.
• Further incentives for R & D .
• Incentives for offshore leasing.
The overall development strategy is
to encourage Singaporeans to change
their work ethic, to study more, and to
produce more goods and services with
practically the same number of workers
in the same amount of time. There will
be no room for idle hands or minds. In
return, workers will get higher pay and
lower taxes.
To some this is an ideal; to others it
may be an unacceptable regimentation.
Many say it takes away the very creative
and innovative force that propels
growth in Singapore today. Lee Kuan
Yew does not really have a successor as
the chief executive officer of Singapore,
Inc. There is little doubt that the
eloquent leadership and imagination of
this Cambridge-educated barrister will
pull the plan through to the next
decade. His successor, however, may
have problems. With a higher standard
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HONG KONG

1940s, 600,000 people packed into one
small island and a tiny beachhead on
the rugged South China coast remained
insulated from an upheaval that
changed the lives of one of every four
human beings on this planet. Hong
Kong emerged from World War II with
a devastated economy. But entrepreneurs were quick to reestablish their
warehouses. Between 1947 and 1957,
the value of total trade increased at an
annual average of 35 percent.
In 1952 disaster struck the colony
when the United Nations imposed a
trade embargo on China. Exports to
China plummeted from HK$1.6 billion
to HK$100 million 10 years later.
Meanwhile, as refugees from China
were swelling the population, the U.S.
and the U.K. quickly replaced China as
the largest markets for Hong Kong's
exports—which became light, locally
manufactured goods. Thus, the trade
embargo with China forced a structural
change in Hong Kong's economy, from
essentially one of trading to one of
fabrication and manufacturing.
Thus transformed, Hong Kong
entered the 1960s well equipped to
cash in on the rapid expansion of world
trade. Manufacturing became the
largest contributor to the GDP and to
employment. In that decade, exports
from Hong Kong to the world increased
by more than 300 percent. The population increased, too; today it stands at
five million.
The discipline of the marketplace
appears to have worked well in terms of
trade and the restructuring of industry
in Hong Kong. The former financial
secretary (now chief secretary) of the
British colonial administration, Sir Philip
Haddon Cave, said, "I believe passionately that if the mixed economy as we
know it is to survive, the free-market
forces should dictate the economic life
of the community." Nowhere is this
better illustrated than in the realm of
fiscal policy. Hong Kong, to many
investors and professionals, is a "tax
haven." With the corporate income tax
at 16.5 percent and individual income
tax at 15 percent, Hong Kong indeed
appears to be a comparatively low tax
jurisdiction.

This tax structure has been used as a
model by conservative economists to
demonstrate that low taxation propels
economic growth and that it has been
the primary instrument in transforming
Hong Kong into an industrialised
economy. However, any society at this
stage of development requires government infrastructural support to
function. Hong Kong provides such
support. It has free medical services for
the needy government hospitals, some
of the free world's most extensive (per
capita) public housing, and a very good,
albeit crowded, road network. These
services require tremendous amounts
of capital investment, of course, but the
capital comes not from tax revenues. It
comes from income of a capital nature.
Estimated revenue and receipts for
tax revenues in 1980-1981 amounted to
about 38 percent of the total government revenue. Land sales, revenue from
property and investments, and rates
on real property account for over
40 percent of the total government
revenue. Because it directly benefits the
government to keep land prices and
redevelopment fees extremely high,
rents and real estate prices are the
highest in the world. The government
finances all of its capital expenditures
from the income derived from its
capital—that is, land, since practically all
of it belongs to the government as the
Crown lessor. Thus, the taxpayer may be
paying low taxes, but his rent is sky
high. In terms of take-home pay and
costs to the employer, Hong Kong is
more expensive than either New York
or London.
The euphemism used by the colonial
administration to describe its fiscal
policy is "neutrality." Again, in Sir
Philip's words, neutrality means "neutral
with regard to the growth rate of the
economy, neutral as regards to cost/
price structure, at least neutral and
preferably (positive) to enterprise and
investment. Having designed our fiscal
policy... if the consequence is that we

have a lot lower-based tax system, that
is the consequence... it's not an
objective."
Therefore, Hong Kong does not grant
any tax incentives to investors, whether
foreign or domestic. With comparatively low tax rates, foreign investors do
not look for or expect tax breaks or tax
holidays. On the other hand, the same
foreign investors, with their unflinching
allegiance to free enterprise and to fair,
open competiton, are vociferous in
protesting against the "unconscionable"
price of office space and living accommodations. These free enterprisers are,
ironically, the vanguard of the forces for
rent controls. Rightly or wrongly, the
action of these foreign investors is
simply a logical and opposite reaction
to Hong Kong's neutral fiscal policyneutral to the taxation of enterprises
and individuals but monopolistic and
manipulative vis-a-vis property prices.
Despite higher rental and even
higher taxation of offshore earnings of
banks situated in the Colony (16.5
percent vs. 10 percent in Singapore),
Hong Kong remains the international
financial centre of Asia. The growth of
the financial services sector is nothing
short of phenomenal. In less than
10 years (1971-79) its contribution to the
GDP increased from 14 percent to
21 percent. The initial stimulus that
triggered the expansion was the
consistent growth performance of the
economy. Also contributing was a
policy of positive noninterventionism
in the economy and, more particularly,
of minimum regulation of, and
minimum reporting requirements for,
banks and other financial institutions,
plus a stable fiscal system with relatively
low tax rates.
Any guesstimate as to Hong Kong's
future must necessarily dwell on the
expiration of its lease. Indeed, given that
1997 is but 14 years away, it is becoming
exceedingly difficult for many to
comprehend how today's accelerated
growth can be sustained in trading,
manufacturing, and financial services.
What the U.K. will do is hardly
relevant. The standard line here is that
all it will take is a telephone call from

China advising that the People's Army is
moving in, and the Prince of Wales'
own Gurkha Rifles will move out. Nor is
international law really the issue. What
matters is that China does not recognize what it refers to as the "unequal
treaty" which ceded Hong Kong in
perpetuity and leased the New Territories to the U.K. The economics of
China's tolerance of the British
"managemenf'of the Colony is what
really counts.
About 70 percent of Hong Kong's
water supply comes from China.
Practically all of its fresh food comes
from China. It is reported that about
25 percent of the credit extended to
Hong Kong borrowers is provided by
China's 13 banks and finance companies
operating in Hong Kong. On the other
hand, Hong Kong is the prime source of
China's foreign exchange. Estimates
vary, but between 40 percent and
70 percent of China's hard currency is
earned from or through Hong Kong.
China's government corporations are
major investors in Hong Kong real
estate as well as the stock market.
Many observers rely on these facts to
reinforce the belief that China will
simply not make that telephone call.
The proposition most businessmen,
political observers, and China watchers
agree on is this: as long as China needs
a window to trade with the world, a
place to raise foreign exchange, and a
training ground on how to deal with a
free-market economy, it will not make
that telephone call. If, in 14 years, it can
open new windows, find other markets
to raise hard currency, and develop new
training grounds for its cadres in free
enterprises, it may yet make that
call—collect. But why should China
want Hong Kong back? The answer is
simple: it is Chinese; and it is China. &
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